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The purpose of our study is to identify the sources of economic growth based on a 
KLEMS model for Japan and Korea. We also identify the growth contribution of ICT 
assets and resource reallocation effects in the two economies. Both Japan and Korea 
enjoyed high TFP growth in ICT-producing sectors but suffered low TFP growth in 
ICT-using sectors. For Japan, we find that the main factor underlying the Lost Decade is 
the slow-down in TFP growth. We also found that Korea’s TFP growth was slow until 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999 but then accelerated after the crisis. It seems that 
before the crisis, Korea was following a catch-up process with developed economies 
that was predominantly input-led and manufacturing-based, as documented by Timmer 
(1999) and Pyo (2001).  However, through the drastic economic reform undertaken 
during the crisis, Korea seems to have shifted to a new phase of economic growth since 
the end of the 1990s. TFP growth rates, especially those in manufacturing sectors, have 
substantially increased in post-crisis Korea. Both in Japan and Korea, productivity in 
service sectors is much lower than in manufacturing. The reason probably is excessive 
regulation and a lack of competition in service sectors. And these factors seem to have 
impeded introduction of ICT in service industries. As for ICT capital accumulation, the 
ICT investment/GDP ratio of Korea is higher than that of Japan. Especially, the speed 
of ICT accumulation in the ICT sector in Korea is much faster than that in Japan. Both 
in Japan and Korea, the largest component in ICT investment is computing equipment. 
In the case of resource reallocation across sectors, the reallocation effect of capital input 
was negligible or negative for most periods both in Korea and Japan. After the financial 
crisis of 1997-99, the resource allocation effect of capital in Korea remained negative, 
although the size of the negative effect declined. On the other hand, the reallocation 





As Krugman (1994), Young (1994), and Lau and Kim’s  (1994) studies have 
shown, the East Asian economic miracle may be characterized as “input-led” growth. 
However, more recently, at least in Japan and the Republic of Korea, investment has 
been stagnating, average working hours have been falling, and the working  age 
population has been decreasing as a result of the decline in the fertility rate. This means 
that a surge in productivity is required for renewed sustainable growth in these countries. 
The purpose of our study is to identify the sources of economic growth based on a 
KLEMS model for Japan and Korea, which experienced a Lost Decade and a financial 
crisis in 1997-1998, respectively. We also identify the growth contribution of ICT assets 
and resource reallocation effects in the two economies.   
Both Japan and Korea enjoyed high TFP growth in ICT-producing sectors but 
suffered low TFP growth in ICT-using sectors. For Japan, we find that the main factor 
underlying the Lost Decade is the slow-down in TFP growth.  We also found that 
Korea’s TFP growth was slow until the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999 but then 
accelerated after the crisis. It seems that before the crisis, Korea was following a catch-
up process with developed  economies  that was  predominantly input-led and 
manufacturing-based,  as documented by  Timmer  (1999) and Pyo (2001).  However, 
through the drastic economic reform undertaken during the crisis, Korea seems to have 
shifted to a new phase of economic growth since the end of the 1990s. TFP growth rates, 
especially those in manufacturing sectors, have substantially increased in post-crisis 
Korea.   
Both in Japan and Korea, productivity in service sectors is much lower than in 
manufacturing. The reason probably is excessive regulation and a lack of competition in 
service sectors. And these factors seem to have impeded introduction of ICT in service 
industries.   
As for ICT capital accumulation, the ICT investment/GDP ratio of Korea is higher 
than that of Japan. Especially, the speed of ICT accumulation in the ICT sector in Korea 
is much faster than that in Japan. Both in Japan and Korea, the largest component in 
ICT investment is computing equipment. 
In the case of resource reallocation across sectors, the reallocation effect of capital 
input was negligible or negative for most periods both in Korea and Japan. After the 
financial crisis of 1997-99, the resource allocation effect of capital in Korea remained 
negative,  although  the size of the negative effect declined. On the other hand, the 
reallocation effect of labor input was positive for most periods both in Korea and Japan.   2 
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines estimates of sectoral TFP 
of Japan and Korea by following the guidelines of database by EU KLEMS project 
accounting framework for the market economy. Section 3 identifies the contribution of 
ICT capital accumulation in Japan and Korea. Section 4 provides estimates of resource 
reallocation effects in Japan and Korea. Section 5 examines how the global financial 
crisis affected the two economies. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Growth Accounting and TFP Growth 
2.1 Overview of Growth Accounting for Japan and Korea in Comparison with the 
Major EU Economies and the United States 
We first report the results of growth accounting for Japan and Korea and compare 
them with  the major EU economies (Germany, France, the UK, and Italy) and the 
United States in Table 1.
1
 












Japan 3.8 0.4 1.9 1.5
Korea 9.5 2.2 7.1 0.2
Germany 1.9 -0.2 1.2 0.8
France 1.8 -0.1 0.7 1.2
UK 2.5 -0.2 1.2 1.5
Italy 1.9 0.2 0.9 0.9
United States 3.3 1.1 1.4 0.8
Japan* 1.1 -0.3 0.9 0.5
Korea 4.8 0.6 3.1 1.1
Germany 1.4 -0.4 0.9 0.7
France 2.5 0.7 0.9 0.8
UK 3.2 0.8 1.4 1.1
Italy 1.5 0.9 1.1 -0.4
United States 3.5 0.8 1.5 1.2
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009. 
* Growth accounting for Japan is for the period 1995-2006.
1980-95
1995-2007
Table 1. Growth Accounting for the Market Economy in Advanced Countries
 
 
                                            
1  The growth accounting analysis for the Japanese economy in this section is based on the EU 
KLEMS Database, November 2009. For details regarding this database, see Timmer et al. (2007). 3 
 
Specifically, the table shows the growth accounting results for the market sector 
of these countries for the periods  1980-1995 and 1995-2007.
2  Although Korea’s 
economic growth slowed down significantly  after the financial  crisis of 1997, the 
country nevertheless recorded the highest growth among the seven countries in both 
periods. The table also shows that Japan experienced a severe slowdown in growth from 
3.8% in 1980-1995 (the second highest during that period) to 1.2% in 1995-2006 (the 
lowest during that period). Germany and Italy experienced a mild slowdown in 
economic growth from 1.9% to 1.4% and from 1.9% to 1.5% respectively.
3
Next, let us look at the contribution of the individual components to overall 
growth. In Japan, all the three factors – labor service input, capital service input and 
TFP – contributed to the slowdown in growth in the market sector. However, of the 
three, the deceleration in TFP growth played the most important role, accounting for 
53% of the slowdown, while the deceleration in capital accumulation and the decline in 
labor input accounted for 34% and 14% of the slowdown, respectively. 
  The US 
experienced  a  relatively  high growth rate  of  over  3.0% in both periods. Growth in 
France accelerated from 1.8% to 2.5%, and that in the UK from 2.5% to 3.2%.   
Turning to Korea, the most important factor underlying the slowdown in overall 
growth is the deceleration in capital service input growth: of the 4.7 percentage-point 
overall decline in the growth rate, 85% was accounted for by the deceleration in capital 
accumulation. The slowdown in labor input growth accounted for 34% of the decline of 
Korea’s growth rate. On the other hand, TFP growth accelerated from 0.2% to 1.1%. 
Let us examine the TFP growth performance in the different countries. 
Comparing the two periods, Japan’s average TFP growth rate dropped by 1 percent 
                                            
2  The EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts are a kind of gross output growth accounting 
in which output is measured by gross output, and inputs are decomposed into capital (K), labor (L), 
energy (E), material (M), and service inputs (S). Since this methodology is essentially based on gross 
output, it has the advantage of separating the productivity effects of intermediate inputs from the 
productivity effects of other inputs, thereby allowing a more accurate measurement of productivity 
by industry. Moreover, the assumption on real value-added production function (separability 
assumption) is not usually guaranteed (See Berndt and Christensen (1973, 1974), Berndt and Wood 
(1975), Denny and Fuss (1977), and Yuhn (1991) for the US, and Pyo and Ha (2007) for Korea), 
which also gives legitimacy to gross output growth accounting. However, gross output growth 
accounting requires more information on intermediate inputs than value-added growth accounting. 
Therefore, the data structure for estimating productivity has to be consistent with not only national 
income accounts but also input-output tables, Use and Make Matrix etc. and the estimation 
methodology for unavailable data should be examined more carefully. Therefore, for international 
productivity comparison, value-added growth accounting has been used more often explicitly or 
implicitly assuming the separability between primary inputs of capital and labor and non-primary 
inputs such as energy, intermediate goods and services. We follow this convention in the present 
paper and adopt value-added growth accounting of the private economy as defined in EU KLEMS. 
3  The EU KLEMS data on Germany for years before Germany’s unification include East Germany. 4 
 
point, from 1.5% in 1980-95 to 0.5% in 1995-2006, while in Korea, the TFP growth rate 
increased  by  0.9  percent points, from 0.2% in 1980-95 to 1.1% in 1995-2007. 
Meanwhile, in the four major EU economies, a mild slowdown can be observed. Taken 
together, the TFP growth rate in the four major economies declined by 0.5 percentage-
points from 1.1% in 1980-95 to 0.6% in 1995-2007.  Finally, the United States 
experienced an acceleration in TFP growth from 0.8% to 1.2%. Thus, among the seven 
major developed economies examined here, Korea and the United States are exceptional 
in the acceleration in TFP growth they experienced. 
These different trends in TFP growth indicate that there is a stark difference in 
the causes underlying the acceleration in overall growth in France, the UK, and Italy on 
the one hand and the United  States  on the other. In the three EU countries, the 
acceleration in economic growth was mainly achieved through labor input growth. As 
Figure 1 shows, the increase in labor input growth in Italy did not take the form of 
improvements in labor quality but of an increase in total hours worked. In contrast, in 
the case of the UK and France, the quality of labor input improved substantially. Until 
1995, these three countries suffered high unemployment rates, especially among the 
less-educated young, but subsequently succeeded in creating jobs for these unemployed. 
The average of the standardized unemployment rate of the three countries declined from 
11.3% in 1995 to 7.4% in 2004. On the other hand, the standardized unemployment rate 
in Japan increased from 3.1% to 4.7% during the same period (OECD 2006). In contrast 
with the three EU countries just mentioned, the main cause of the growth acceleration in 
the United States was the increase in TFP growth mentioned above. 5 
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009.
* Growth accounting for Japan is for the period 1995-2006.
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Next, Figure 2 depicts the contribution of capital accumulation. In Japan, there 
was a large decline in the contribution of capital accumulation to economic growth. The 
contribution of capital accumulation also declined slightly in Korea and Germany. In 
contrast, in all the other four  countries, the contribution of capital input growth 
increased. In particular the United States and the UK experienced an acceleration in 
capital accumulation. This capital deepening in the two countries was mainly caused by 
the rapid accumulation of ICT capital. 6 
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009.
* Growth accounting for Japan is for the period 1995-2006.
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To sum up the analysis so far, Korea and the US are exceptional in experiencing 
accelerations in TFP growth. The four major EU economies (Germany, France, the UK 
and Italy) and Japan experienced a slowdown in TFP growth of a similar magnitude 
after 1995. It is not differences in TFP growth but differences in factor input growth that 
are responsible for the large difference in the economic growth performance of France, 
the UK and Italy on the one hand and Japan on the other in the period after 1995.   
Next, we compare industry level TFP growth in the seven countries before and 
after 1995 (Figure 3). Beginning with the electrical machinery, post and communication 
sector (the ICT-producing sector), we find that Korea still had the highest TFP growth 
in the period after 1995, followed by the United States. The ICT-producing sector is the 
leading sector for enhancing productivity growth in Korea The input of ICT capital 
services in the ICT-producing sector having also increased strongly since 1995.
4
                                            
4  See Ha and Pyo (2004) and Table 3 in Section 3.2 below. 
  On the 
other hand, Japan’s TFP growth in the ICT-producing sector after 1995 declined to a 
level in the middle-range of the seven economies. However, both in Korea and in Japan, 
TFP growth in this sector is higher than that in the other five sectors. The problem for 7 
 
Korea and Japan though is that, like in the other countries, the share of this sector in the 
overall economy is not very large. The average share of labor input (hours worked) in 
this sector in Korea’s and Japan’s total labor input in 1995-2007 was 4.8% and 4.1%, 
respectively. In the United States, this share was 3.8%. 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009.
* Growth accounting for Japan is for the period 1995-2006.



































































































































































































































































Finance and business services
 
The largest declines in TFP growth in Japan occurred in distribution services 
(retail, wholesale,  and transportation) and in manufacturing other than electrical 
machinery. The labor input shares of these two sectors were 22.8% and 16.5%, 
respectively. Korea experienced a severe slowdown in TFP growth in all sectors except 
the ICT-producing sector,  the rest of the  manufacturing sector  and the distribution 
sector. In the case of Korea, we observe that the estimated TFP  growth  rates in 
manufacturing in general are larger than in services. This may be due to the fact that 
innovations such as product or process innovation are more common in manufacturing 
than in services. Also, R&D investment for innovation is in general more intensive in 
manufacturing than in services. This may explain why TFP  growth rates in 
manufacturing are greater than in services. 
TFP  growth in personal and social services was negative in all the countries 8 
 
examined here except in  the United  States  (both periods) and France (1995-2007). 
Moreover, with the exception of the United States, the UK and Japan, TFP growth in 
finance and business services was negative in all the countries examined here. 
To sum up the above analysis, Korea and Japan experienced relatively high TFP 
growth in the ICT-producing sector. However, the problem for the two countries is that 
TFP growth in ICT-using sectors, such as distribution services (retail, wholesale and 
transportation) and in the rest of the manufacturing sector, especially in Japan, declined 
substantially after 1995, and these ICT-using sectors have larger shares in the economy 
than the ICT-producing sector. 
 
2.2. The Cumulative Contribution of Sectors to TFP Growth in Japan and Korea 
Following Farrell, Baily and Remes (2005) and Fukao, Kim and Kwon (2006), we 
plot a modified Harberger (1998) diagram to examine the contribution of individual 
sectors to macro-level productivity growth. The results for the Japanese economy are 
shown in Figures 4,  5, and 6.  The vertical axes  display the cumulative sector 
contributions to aggregate TFP growth, while the horizontal axes depict the cumulative 
share of sectoral weights, that is, each sector’s gross output over the summation of all 
the sectors’  gross output.  Sectors are lined up by descending order of their TFP 
contribution. 
Figure 4 shows the sectoral TFP growth contribution for the period 1973-2006 for 
the market economy. The weight of the sectors with positive TFP growth is 66%, while 
the weight of sectors with negative TFP growth is 34%. The top five sectors in terms of 
their TFP growth contribution are wholesale trade, electrical and optical equipment, 
financial intermediation, retail trade, and machinery, nec.. As can be seen, productivity 
growth in the economy as a whole, which is represented by the broken horizontal line, 
was lower than the sum of the contributions of these five leading sectors. Sectors whose 
contribution to economy-wide TFP growth was negative include construction, hotels 
and restaurants, and real estate. 
Figure  5  shows  the  cumulative contribution to  TFP  growth  within the 
manufacturing sector. In manufacturing, most industries made a positive contribution to 
TFP growth: the weight of the gross output of industries with positive TFP growth is 
79%. Only three industries, pulp, paper and publishing, food, beverages and tobacco, 
and coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel  underwent  substantial  negative  TFP 
growth. 
Next,  Figure  6  shows  the  cumulative contribution to  TFP  growth  within the 
service sector. In services, the TFP contribution of growth in about half of the industries 9 
 
was negative. The weight of gross output of industries with negative TFP growth is 50% 
and, as a result, TFP growth of the overall service sector in the period 1973-2006 was 
relatively small. 
The above results indicate that for Japan’s economy to achieve sustained TFP 
growth, an acceleration of productivity growth in the service sector is indispensable. 
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Cumulative industry output percentile in aggregate gross output
Figure 4. Cumulative Contribution of Industries to TFP Growth:
Japan, 1973-2006, Market Economy
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009. 10 
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Cumulative industry output percentile in aggregate gross output
Figure 5. Cumulative Contribution of Industries to TFP Growth:
Japan, 1973-2006, Manufacturing
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009. 11 
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Cumulative industry output percentile in aggregate gross output
Figure 6. Cumulative Contribution of Industries to TFP Growth:
Japan, 1973-2006, Service
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009. 
 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 show the results for Korea. We start considering the economy 
as a whole, where the weight of gross output of sectors with positive TFP growth in the 
period 1972-2007 is about 68%, while that of sectors with negative TFP growth is about 
32%. Figure 7 shows which sectors made a positive contribution to economy-wide TFP 
growth. Leading sectors in this group include post and telecommunications  and 
financial intermediation in services, and electronic valves and tubes, telecommunication 
equipment, office, accounting and computer machinery in manufacturing. On the other 
hand,  sectors with a  negative contribution to economy-wide  TFP  growth  were, for 
example, agriculture, construction, retail trade, wholesale trade, and legal, technical and 
advertising services. 
Figure 8 shows the industry contribution to TFP growth in the manufacturing 
sector. The weight of the gross output of industries that made a positive TFP growth 
contribution in manufacturing is 93%, while the weight of those that made a negative 
TFP growth contribution is 7%. Industries making a leading contribution to TFP growth 
include  the  ICT industries, i.e., electronic valves and tubes, telecommunication 
equipment, office, accounting and computing machinery, other electrical machinery and 12 
 
apparatus,  radio and TV receivers, and a number of non-ICT industries, including 
chemicals,  basic metals, motor vehicles, textiles, and pharmaceuticals.  On the other 
hand, industries with negative TFP growth are coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel, printing and reproduction, and railroad equipment and transport equipment.   
Results for services are shown in Figure 9. The weight of the gross output of 
sectors with positive TFP growth in services is only about 44%, while the weight of 
sectors  with negative TFP  growth is 56%.  Service industries that made a positive 
contribution to TFP  growth include inland transport, post and telecommunications, 
financial intermediation, electricity supply, and insurance and pensions. Industries with 
negative TFP growth include construction, retail trade, wholesale trade, legal, technical 
and advertising services, research and development, and other service activities. 
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Cumulative industry output percentile in aggregate gross output
Figure 7. Cumulative Contribution of Industries to TFP Growth: Korea, 1972-2007, 
Market Economy
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009. 13 
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Cumulative industry output percentile in aggregate gross output
Figure 8. Cumulative Contribution of Industries to TFP Growth: Korea, 1972-2007, 
Manufacturing
 












































































Cumulative industry output percentile in aggregate gross output
Figure 9. Cumulative Contribution to Industries to TFP Growth: Korea, 1972-2007, Services
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009. 
 
3. Has ICT Investment Contributed to Economic Growth in Japan and Korea? 
3.1 Accumulation of ICT Assets in Japan and Korea 
 14 
 
Using the EU KLEMS Database, November 2009, the JIP Database 2009,
5  and 
the KIP Database 2009
6  we are able to extract data on ICT assets and compare the 
trends in ICT investment in the two countries.
7
Developments in ICT investment in Japan are shown in Figure 10. ICT 
investment in Japan grew steadily until 1991 and for the period 1970-2006 overall, its 
average growth rate was 11.7% per annum. However, since the early 1990s growth has 
been more uneven. Stagnating in the first half of the 1990s, ICT investment picked up 
again during the second half of the decade and has continued to increase. In 2006, ICT 
investment stood at 19.6 trillion yen (in 2000 constant prices), accounting for 15% of 
total investment. The biggest component within ICT investment is investment in 
computers and other ICT equipment, which in 2006 amounted to 9.9 trillion yen or 50% 
of total ICT investment. 
  Following the classification in the EU 
KLEMS  Database,  ICT assets consist  of computer and peripheral equipment, 
communication equipment, and software. 
                                            
5  For details on the JIP Database, see Fukao et al. (2007). The JIP Database 2009 contains annual 
data on 108 sectors in economy-wide during 1970-2006. 
6  The KIP Database 2009 contains annual data on 72 sectors in economy-wide during 1970-2007. 
7  The EU KLEMS Database, November 2009 does not provide ICT investment and ICT capital 
services in the market sector in Japan and Korea. Therefore, in the following figures and tables in 
Section 3, we constructed ICT investment and ICT capital services series in the market economy 






















































































Source: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009, and JIP Database 2009. 






The trend in ICT investment in Korea is shown in Figure 11. The annual average 
growth rate of ICT investment in Korea for the period 1970-2007 is 15.5%, which is 
higher than the growth rate in Japan. However, for the period 1995-2007, the growth 
rate of Korean ICT investment, at 5.3%, was almost the same as that of Japanese ICT 
investment (5.9%  for 1995-2006). Although Korean ICT investment showed steady 
growth until 1997, it declined drastically in 1998 due to the Asian currency crisis. 
However, it recovered rapidly and reached to 45 trillion won in 2007. The share of ICT 
investment in total investment in Korea was 19.4% in 2007. As in Japan, the largest 
component in ICT investment in Korea is computing equipment, accounting for 47.6% 




























































































Next, we compare the ICT investment/GDP ratios of major developed economies, 
including Japan and Korea, both expressed in nominal terms (Figure 12). We find that 
the trends in the ICT investment/GDP ratios in the major developed countries since the 
late 1990s fall into two groups. In Korea, the United States, and the UK, the ratios 
increased rapidly and reached almost 5% in 2007. Although ICT investment in these 
countries slowed down after the collapse of the  ICT bubble  in the early 2000s, it 
subsequently recovered gradually. On the other hand, in the other countries, the ratios 
were only in the order of 3%. While Japan’s ICT investment/GDP ratio was as high as 
those in the United States and the UK until the mid 1990s, it has stagnated since 1995. 
In  contrast to Japan, Korea’s ICT investment/GDP ratio caught up with that of the 
United States and the UK, although it fell drastically in 1998 due to the Asian financial 



























































































































Sources: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009 ; JIP Database 2009; KIP Database 
2009.









Turning to the growth in ICT capital services in the major developed economies, 
the trends are shown in Figure 13. In three countries (the UK, the United States, and 
Korea) the growth rates of ICT capital services in the period after 1995 exceeded 10% 
per annum. However, the growth rate of ICT capital services for Japan was one of the 

























































































































1995=100 Figure 13. Growth in ICT Capital Services in the 












3.2 The Contribution of ICT Capital Services to Economic Growth in Korea and Japan 
 
Using the growth accounting method we compare the contribution of ICT capital 
services to economic growth in Korea and Japan (Table 2). We find that in the period 
1980-2007, the growth rate of value added in Korea was considerably higher than that 
in Japan. As shown in the table, the high growth rate in Korea was largely driven by the 
rapid increase in capital services, while in Japan the increase in capital services was 
much  slower.  However, the substantial gap between the two countries in the 
contribution of capital services is not the result of a difference in the growth of ICT 
capital services but the difference in the growth of non-ICT capital services. 
 19 
 
Table 2. Growth Accounting Including ICT Capital Services (Market economy) (%)
Korea Japan Korea Japan Korea Japan*
Value added 9.5 3.9 5.0 1.0 4.6 1.0
 Labor 2.2 0.4 0.2 -0.4 0.8 -0.7
  Man-hours 1.6 0.1 -0.2 -0.9 0.1 -1.0
  Labor quality 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4
 Capital 7.1 2.0 3.9 1.1 2.5 1.1
  ICT capital 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
  Non-ICT capital 6.5 1.5 3.1 0.6 2.2 0.6
 TFP 0.2 1.5 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.6
Sources: EU KLEMS Database, November 2009, and KIP Database 2009.
*Growth accounting for Japan is for the period from 2000 to 2006.
1980-1995 1995-2000  2000-2007
 
Next, we compare the contribution of ICT capital services to economic growth by 
industry for all seven countries considered here. As shown in Table 3, the contribution 
of capital services in the market economy in 1995-2000 and 2000-2007 was highest in 
the UK and the United States, although in the latter period it declined in all advanced 
countries, except in the United States. 
 Table 3. Contribution of ICT Capital Services Input Growth to Economic Growth  (%)
France Germany Italy Japan Korea UK US France Germany* Italy* Japan** Korea UK US
Market economy total 0.54 0.68 0.43 0.50 0.73 0.95 0.57 0.26 0.34 0.13 0.37 0.36 0.56 0.57
Electrical machinery, post and
communication
0.16 0.18 0.80 1.30 0.47 2.46 0.82 0.65 0.25 0.15 0.77 0.59 0.96 0.45
Manufacturing, excluding
electrical
0.33 0.20 0.28 0.32 0.95 0.46 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.21 0.39 0.21 0.31
Other goods producing industries 0.28 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.09 0.20 0.64 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.32
Distribution services 0.54 0.49 0.46 0.16 0.69 0.81 0.53 0.19 0.21 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.55 0.54
Finance and business services 1.00 2.13 0.76 0.45 1.19 1.73 0.75 0.51 0.99 0.34 0.37 0.62 1.01 1.04
Personal and social services 0.48 0.27 0.38 0.12 1.45 0.49 0.57 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.21 0.17





Looking at individual industries, we find that in the electrical machinery, post and 
communication industry, the contribution of ICT capital services in Japan was relatively 
high in 1995-2000. The contribution of ICT capital services in the Japanese electrical 
machinery, post and communication industry declined in the latter period, whereas that 
in Korea increased. 
In the service sector, notable results include the  low  contribution of capital 
services to economic growth in the Japanese service sector when compared with the 
other countries examined here. 20 
 
 
Another notable pattern is the relatively high contribution of ICT capital services 
in  Korea’s  finance and business services when compared with other sectors in the 
country.   
 
4. Resource Reallocation Effects in Japan and Korea   
4.1 Measurement Methodology and Results for the Market Economy as a Whole 
 
It is commonly observed that factor prices for the same category of labor and 
rates of return to capital are different across industries. If such differences are caused by 
institutional obstacles to inter-industry factor movements and each factor price is equal 
to the marginal product of that production factor, GDP can be raised by shifting 
production factors from industries with low factor prices to those with high factor prices. 
In this section, we analyze how such resource reallocations have contributed to Japan’s 
and Korea’s economic growth.
8
Let us examine this issue in a growth accounting framework. As Jorgenson et al. 
(2007) have shown, the way in which the resource reallocation effect is measured in 
growth accounting depends on the type of growth accounting method chosen. In the 
case of growth accounting in the EU KLEMS project, factor price equalization between 
industries is not assumed and macro-level factor inputs are calculated by a Tornqvist 
index, in which factor input growth across industries is aggregated by using the factor 
income in each industry as aggregation weights. Therefore, if production factors move 
from low factor price industries to high factor price industries, this reallocation will be 
treated as an increase in macro-level factor inputs. Jorgenson et al. (2007) labeled this 
type of growth accounting method the “direct aggregation across industries” approach.   
   
However, there is another type of growth accounting method, which Jorgenson et 
al. (2007) called the “production possibility frontier” approach. In this case, each input 
is assumed to receive the same price in all industries. The macro-level quantity of each 
input is the simple sum of inputs across industries. In this approach, reallocation effects 
are included in macro TFP growth.   
Jorgenson et al. (2007) showed the following relationship between the macro TFP 
growth derived from the production possibility frontier approach, νT, and the macro TFP 
growth derived from the direct aggregation across industries approach, νT
D:   
                                            
8  For more details on the analysis of resource reallocation effects in Japan, see Fukao, Miyagawa 
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where  νT





















  (2) 
The upper bars denote the average values across periods t and t+1. Δ represents the 
change of a value from period t to period t+1, wj is the proportion of industry j’s value 
added in aggregate value added, νK, j and νL, j are the share of capital and of labor income 
in industry j’s gross output, and νV, j stands for industry j’s value added-gross output 
ratio. Therefore the coefficient of νj, wj/νK, j, in equation (2) denotes the ratio of industry 
j’s gross output to aggregated value added. Equation (2) implies that the macro TFP 
growth derived from the direct-aggregation-across-industries approach, νT
D, is equal to 
the direct aggregation of each industry’s TFP growth with Domar weights.   
In equation (1), Kj denotes the Tornqvist index of capital input in industry j and Lj 
the Tornqvist index of labor input in industry j:   
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Kk,j denotes input of type k capital in industry j and Ll,j input of type l labor in industry j. 
Similarly, PK,k,j denotes the price for type k capital in industry j and PL,l,j the price for 
type l labor in industry j. 
 22 
 
K and L denote the macro-level capital input index and the macro-level labor 
input index, which are calculated under the assumption of identical factor prices across 
industries:   
∑ ∆ = ∆
k
k k K w K ln ln  
∑ ∆ = ∆
l
l l L w L ln ln  
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PK,k stands for the economy-wide average price for type k capital and PL,l the 
economy-wide average price for type l  labor. In equation (1), νK  represents the 
aggregated capital income-value added ratio and νL the aggregated labor income-value 
added ratio.   
The second term on the right-hand side of equation (1) denotes the effect of 
capital reallocation on macro TFP growth, νT, which is derived from the production 
possibility frontier approach. Similarly, the third term on the right-hand side of equation 
(1) denotes the effect of labor reallocation on macro TFP growth, νT, which is derived 
from the production possibility frontier approach. We can rewrite the second term on 
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In equation (3), the value of wjνK, j/νV, j is equal to the ratio of capital income in 
industry  j  to the macro-level value added. The value of this coefficient shows the 
percentage increase in GDP for a one-percent increase in capital input in industry j. On 
the other hand, the value of wK,jνK shows the percentage increase in GDP for a one-
percent increase in capital input in industry j when the average price of capital across 
different types of capital in industry j is equal to the economy-wide average price of 
capital, that is, ΣkPK,k,jKk,j=ΣkPK,kKk,j.   
Therefore, the first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) denotes the inter-
industry reallocation effect of aggregated capital. If the industry-level growth rate of 
capital input, Δln Kj, is positive in industries where the industry-level average capital 
price is higher than the macro-level average capital price, i.e., ΣkPK,k,jKk,j>ΣkPK,kKk,j, and 
if the industry-level growth rate of capital input, Δln Kj, is negative in industries where 
the industry-level average capital price is lower than the macro-level average capital 
price, i.e., ΣkPK,k,jKk,j<ΣkPK,kKk,j, then there will be a positive inter-industry reallocation 
effect of aggregated capital.   
In the case of the continuous time version of equation (3), the second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (3) can be expressed as   




































j k k K
j k k K
k
j k j k K
j k j k K
j k
j k k K
k















ˆ ν  
Therefore, we can interpret the second term on the right-hand side of equation (3) as the 
reallocation effect of changes in the capital composition within each industry. Suppose 
that the relative price of type k capital to the average value of prices for other types of 
capital in industry j is lower than the macro-level average relative price of type k capital, 
then  an  increase of capital input of this type in industry j  will improve resource 
allocation and raise the macro TFP growth rate derived from the production possibility 
frontier approach, νT. 
A similar interpretation applies to the labor reallocation effect. The third term on 
the right-hand side of equation (1) can be decomposed into the  inter-industry 
reallocation effect of aggregated labor and the reallocation effect of changes in the labor 
composition within each industry.   24 
 
Using this methodology, let us now look at our estimates of reallocation effects 
for the market economy as whole for the two countries. For an analysis of resource 
reallocation effects, it is preferable to use a database with well disaggregated industry 
classification. Therefore, we use the JIP Database 2009 and the KIP
 Database 2009 
instead of the EU KLEMS Database. Table 4 shows the TFP growth in Japan and Korea 
derived from the production possibility frontier approach, νT, the TFP growth derived 
from the approach by direct aggregation across industries, νT
D, the reallocation effect of 
capital input, and the reallocation effect of labor input for each period. It should be 
noted that the analysis here only focuses on reallocation effects in the market economy, 
not the economy as a whole. 
This table shows that in Japan the reallocation effect of labor input was negative 
in  all  periods.  However, there was a positive and substantial reallocation effect of 
capital input for the whole period analyzed except for the period 2000-06. The table also 
shows that,  during the period 1990-2000, the total  reallocation effect of labor and 
capital input became greater than the Domar-weighted TFP growth (macro TFP growth 
derived from the approach by direct aggregation across industries approach), νT
D. 
However, during the period 2000-06 Japan experienced a large negative reallocation 
effect of labor and of capital input. 
In contrast to the case of Japan, the reallocation effect of labor input in Korea was 
greater than the reallocation effect of capital input in all periods. For the period 1980-
2000 we find relatively large negative values for the reallocation effect of capital input. 
However, the reallocation effect of labor input was positive and greater than the Domar-
weighted TFP growth during the period 1980-90. Thus, while the reallocation of labor, 
that is the shift of labor from low wage industries to high wage industries, has made a 
substantial positive contribution to Korea’s aggregate TFP growth, the contribution of 
capital reallocation has been negative.
9
To sum up the above analysis, it seems that Japan has problems mainly in the 
reallocation of labor input,  while Korea’s  problems  lie more in  the  reallocation of 
capital input. 
 
                                            
9  Korea was hit by Asian financial crisis during 1997-1999. In order to analyze resource reallocation 
effects under normal economic conditions, we also calculated aggregate reallocation effects for 
1990-97 and 1999-2007 in Table 4. 25 
 
Table 4. Aggregate Reallocation Effects in Japan and Korea 
(Average annual growth rates: %)
Japan 1975-80 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-06
(1) Growth rate of aggregated TFP, ν T a=b+c+d 2.71 1.64 0.23 0.51
(2) Domar weighted TFP growth, ν T
D b 2.60 1.73 0.10 1.13
(3) Reallocation effect of capital input c 0.13 0.27 0.15 -0.29
(4) Reallocation effect of labor input d -0.01 -0.36 -0.03 -0.33
Korea 1972-80 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-07 1990-97 1999-2007
(1) Growth rate of aggregated TFP, ν T a=b+c+d -0.81 -0.56 -0.12 0.52 -0.64 0.69
(2) Domar weighted TFP growth, ν T
D b 0.17 0.08 0.57 1.01 0.14 1.18
(3) Reallocation effect of capital input c -1.39 -1.20 -0.84 -0.57 -0.99 -0.55
(4) Reallocation effect of labor input d 0.41 0.56 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.05
*The estimates for Japan are from Fukao, Miyagawa and Takizawa (2007).  
4.2 Industry-Level Reallocation Effects of Capital and Labor in Japan 
 
While the results shown in Table 4 are instructive, they show us neither in what 
sectors factor prices are high,  nor how production factors have  moved  between 
industries.  In order to intuitively  understand  the  process of capital and labor input 
reallocation, we examine reallocation effects across industries. The results are shown in 
Tables 5(a) and (b).   
We begin with the table for capital input (Table 5(a)), which shows the aggregate 
reallocation effect, (wjνK,j/νV,j − wK,jνK)Δln Kj, as well as its two components, wjνK,j/νV,j − 
wK,jνK and Δln Kj, for the periods 1975-1990, 1990-2000, and 2000-2006. Values are on 
an  annual basis. As explained above (Section 4.1),  wjνK,j/νV,j  − wK,jνK is positive in 
industries where the industry-level average capital price is higher than the macro-level 
average capital price. We also prepared a similar table to show the process of labor 
input reallocation across sectors (Table 5(b)).   
Because the number of industries used for the derivation of Table 4 is too large to 
obtain instructive results, the tables here show resource reallocation effects based on 
more aggregated industry classifications. Specifically, the whole market economy is 
decomposed  into seven sectors, that is, ICT-using manufacturing, ICT-using non-
manufacturing, ICT-producing manufacturing, ICT-producing non-manufacturing, non-
ICT intensive manufacturing, non-ICT intensive non-manufacturing, and other 
industries. We then examine resource reallocation across these sectors, definitions of 
which are provided in Appendix Table 1. 
Table 5(a) shows that, in almost all industries, capital inputs increased in the three 
periods. Therefore, industries with high capital prices, such as the  ICT-using non-
manufacturing sector (e.g., finance, insurance, gas and water supply, wholesale, retail) 
contributed to the improvement of capital allocation. On the other hand, industries with 26 
 
low capital prices, such as the non-ICT intensive non-manufacturing sector (e.g., real 
estate, transportation, eating and drinking places),  were  responsible for negative 
reallocation effects. In Japan, capital inputs declined substantially in the ICT-producing 
manufacturing sector after 2000. This probably reflects the fact that Japanese electronics 
firms  were losing their  competitiveness in the 2000s, capital prices in this industry 
declined substantially, and this change created the small positive reallocation effect of 
capital inputs after 2000. 
 
 
Table 5(b) shows the industry-level reallocation effect of aggregated labor input, 
(wjνL,j/νV,j – wL,jνL)Δln Lj, and the two components of this value, wjνL,j/νV,j – wL,jνL and 
Δln Lj, in Japan for the periods 1975-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2006. Labor prices are 
highest in the ICT-producing non-manufacturing sector (e.g., telephone and information 
services, broadcasting).  The labor input decrease  in this sector after 2000 created 
negative reallocation effects. The second-highest labor prices can be found in the ICT-
producing manufacturing sector. Again, the rapid decrease of labor inputs in this sector 
resulted in negative  labor  reallocation effects in the 2000s.  In  other industries (the 
primary sector, construction and civil engineering), in which labor prices are low, the 
decline of labor input created a positive reallocation effect.   
 27 
 
4.3 Industry-Level Reallocation Effect of Capital and Labor in Korea 
Table 6(a) shows the industry-level reallocation effect of aggregated  capital 
inputs  in Korea for each period. As in Japan,  capital inputs increased in the three 
periods in all industries. Therefore, industries with high capital prices, such as ICT-
producing non-manufacturing,  contributed  positively  to the improvement of capital 
allocation during 1990-2000. In contrast with Japan, where capital prices are highest in 
the ICT-using non-manufacturing sector, capital prices in Korea are highest in ICT-
producing non-manufacturing  (post and telecommunication),  and these industries 
created slightly positive reallocation effects. On the other hand, as in Japan, capital 
prices in the  non-ICT intensive non-manufacturing sector (e.g.,  real estate, 
transportation, eating and drinking places) were low and this sector was responsible for 
large negative reallocation effects. 
 
 
Table 6(b) shows the industry-level reallocation effect of aggregated labor inputs 
in Korea for each period.   
As in  Japan, other industries (the primary sector,  construction and civil 
engineering) have the lowest labor prices. In Korea, labor inputs in this sector declined 
steadily  over  the last three decades at an annual rate of about two percent. This 28 
 
continuous movement of workers from the low labor price sector to other sectors 
created large positive labor reallocation effects in Korea. 
Until 1990, jobs were mainly created in the manufacturing sectors. After that, 
however, the two sectors that absorbed the most workers were ICT-producing non-
manufacturing and non-ICT intensive non-manufacturing (e.g.,  real estate, 
transportation, eating and drinking places).  The  ICT-producing non-manufacturing 
sector has high labor prices and was responsible for positive labor reallocation effects. 
On the other hand, the non-ICT intensive non-manufacturing sector has low labor prices 
and was responsible for negative labor reallocation effects. 
 
5. How  Did  the  Global Financial  Crisis  Affect  the  Japanese  and Korean 
Economies? 
In this section, we examine how the global financial crisis of 2008 has affected the 
Japanese and Korean economies. Unfortunately, sectoral growth accounting data for the 
post-crisis period are not available yet. Therefore, we mainly use SNA statistics and the 
Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED) in this section. First, we analyze 
how macroeconomic demand and production changed in the two countries. 
Before the global financial crisis, Japan and Korea enjoyed export driven 
economic growth. As Figures 14(a) and (b) show, in both countries, exports of goods 
and services recorded the highest growth among all the demand components from 2002 
to 2007. Because of bad loan problems in the 1990s, banks were conservative and 
financial regulation was relatively strict in the two countries. The global financial crisis 
hit these economies mainly through the sharp drop in exports (Figures 14(a) and (b)). 
Not only exports to the United States and European countries, but also exports to East 
Asian developing economies, such as China, declined sharply. This is because Japan 
and Korea exported huge amounts of advanced parts and components to East Asian 
developing countries, where these were used as inputs for the production of final goods, 
which were then exported to the United States and Europe.
10
                                            
10  This trade pattern is called “triangle trade.” In exchange for their exports of parts and components, 
Japan and Korea purchased US federal bonds. In this way, the triangle was closed. For more details 
on intra-regional trade and the division of labor within East Asia, see Ahn, Fukao, and Ito (2008) and 
Fukao and Yuan (2009).   
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            (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/en/sna/menu.html).
Source: Downloaded from Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office, Japan
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Source: Downloaded from the Bank of Korea Economic Statistics System 
             (http://ecos.bok.or.kr/EIndex_en.jsp).
























































Gross fixed capital 
formation
Exports of goods and 
services





Comparing Figure 14(a) with Figure 14(b), we find that Japan’s exports and GDP 
dropped much more  sharply than Korea’s.  Several factors are responsible for  this 
difference between the two countries. First, compared with Korea’s exports, Japan’s 
exports consist more of capital goods and high-end parts and components, which were 
hit hardest by the crisis. Second, in the pre-crisis period, Japan’s  exports  were 
concentrated on the United  States,  the  EU,  and  East Asia. Compared with Japan’s, 
Korea’s exports were more globally diversified. Third, the real effective exchange rates 
of the currencies of the two countries moved very differently (Figure 15). Since Japan’s 
interbank interest rates were already very low in the pre-crisis period, there was no 
room for Japan’s central bank to substantially cut interest rates. In this situation, interest 
reductions abroad resulted in an increase in the value of the Japanese yen. On the other 
hand, Korea succeeded in reducing the value of the Korean won. Fourth, it seems that 
Japanese automobile companies, such as Toyota, were very nimble in reducing their 
exports and domestic production in the wake of the crisis, probably in order to avoid an 
increase in their inventories abroad.   
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.



























































































































































































































































































































Mainly because of the drop in exports, Japan’s gross fixed capital formation also 
declined sharply. The drop in net exports and investment reduced Japan’s GDP by 7% 31 
 
from 2007 to 2009 (Figure 16). In contrast with Japan, Korea was the best performer in 
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Figure 16. Real GDP of Major OECD 















Finally, let us see what happened on the supply-side in Japan and Korea after the 
crisis. Figures 17(a) and (b) show growth accounting results at the macro-level for the 
two economies for recent years. For the analysis, we use the Conference Board Total 
Economy Database (TED). 
In both economies, a sharp drop in labor input and TFP occurred after the crisis. 
Probably capital and labor hoarding contributed to the drop in TFP. In addition to the 
sharp drop in labor input and TFP, in the case of Japan, the contribution of changes in 
capital input became negative in the wake of the crisis. In contrast with this, Korea 
experienced a relatively mild slowdown in capital accumulation and the contribution of 
changes in capital input stayed positive in Korea in the wake of the crisis.   
According to a recent study by the IMF, which examined 88 banking crises and 
222 currency crises, many crisis-hit countries around the world experienced a large and 
prolonged drop in TFP and a sharp decline in investment (IMF 2009). Using plant-level 
data on Argentina’s manufacturing sector, Sandleris and Wright (2010) considered 
productivity dynamics before and after the systemic banking crisis of 2001 and found 32 
 
that more than half of the roughly 10% decline in measured TFP could be explained by 
the deterioration in the allocation of resources both across and within sectors. Against 
this background, an interesting question is how much of the TFP drops in Japan and 
Korea was caused by the deterioration in the allocation of resources. In order to answer 
this question, we need to wait until sectoral and firm-level data become available.   
Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED), January 2011
(http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/).

























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Contribution of man-hour 
growth
Contribution of non-ICT 
capital services growth
Contribution of ICT capital 
services growth





Source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database, January 2011 (http://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/).
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Using the recently released EU KLEMS Database (November 2009) and other 
statistics, we conducted growth accounting analyses  for  Korea and Japan. We also 
compared the movement in ICT investment in Japan with that in Korea based on the 
data of Pyo, Jung and Cho (2007). In addition, we compared the impact of ICT capital 
services on economic growth in Japan and the United States and major EU countries. 
Using the KIP  Database  2009  and the JIP Database 2009, we also examined the 
reallocation of resources in Korea and Japan.  We  analyzed  this issue in  a growth 
accounting framework based on Jorgenson et al. (2007). 
The major results obtained through our analysis are as follows.   
First, we found that  the slow-down  in  TFP  growth  was a main factor behind 
Japan’s Lost Decade. We also found that Korea’s TFP growth was slow until the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1999. However, after the crisis, Korea’s TFP growth, especially 
in manufacturing sectors, accelerated. It seems that before the crisis, Korea was in a 
catch-up process with developed  economies  that was  predominantly input-led and 
manufacturing-based, as documented in Timmer (1999) and Pyo (2001).   
Second, we observe that the estimated TFP growth rates in manufacturing are in 
general much greater than in services both in Korea and Japan.   
Third, both economies experienced a slowdown in economic growth in the 1990s. 
However, growth accounting for both economies tells different stories. The Japanese 
economy experienced similar problems as the major EU economies with regard to the 
slowdown in TFP growth.
11
Fourth,  the  TFP  growth rate in the ICT-producing  sector in the  Japanese and 
Korean economies is higher than that in other sectors, including ICT-using sectors. In 
particular  the  TFP  growth rate in the  Korean ICT-producing service sector is 
extraordinarily high. 
  On the other hand, the slowdown in capital accumulation is 
a major factor underlying  the slowdown in  economic growth in  Korea after the 
currency crisis in 1997.   
Fifth, as for ICT capital accumulation, the ICT investment/GDP ratio in Korea 
was much higher than that in Japan. Comparing ICT capital accumulation in Japan with 
that in the United States and the major EU countries we find that Japanese ICT capital 
accumulation was slower than that in other countries except Italy after 1995. Both in 
Japan and Korea, the largest component in ICT investment is computing equipment. 
                                            
11  Among the seven major developed economies, the United States and Korea are exceptional in the 
acceleration in TFP growth they experienced. 34 
 
Sixth, the capital reallocation effect was negligible or negative for most of the 
periods  both in Korea and Japan.  After the financial  crisis of 1997-99,  the capital 
resource allocation effect in Korea remained negative, but the size of the negative effect 
declined. On the other hand, the labor reallocation effect was positive for most of the 
periods both in Korea and Japan. 
Seventh and finally, the recent global financial crisis hit the Korean and Japanese 
economies mainly through a sharp drop in exports. Japan’s exports and GDP dropped 
much more sharply than Korea’s. Korea was the best performer among the seven major 
developed economies considered here from the viewpoint of economic growth in the 
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Appendix Table 1. Classification of ICT sectors
JIP code IT-using manufacturing sector
20 Printing, plate making for printing and bookbinding
23 Chemical fertilizers
24 Basic inorganic chemicals
29 Pharmaceutical products
34 Pottery
38 Smelting and refining of non-ferrous metals
42 General industry machinery
45 Office and service industry machines 
46 Electrical generating, transmission, distribution and industrial apparatus
53 Miscellaneous electrical machinery equipment
56 Other transportation equipment
59 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
JIP code IT-using non-manufacturing sector








86 Rental of office equipment and goods
88 Other services for businesses
92 Publishers
JIP code IT-producing manufacturing sector
47 Household electric appliances 
48 Electronic data processing machines, digital and analog computer, equipment and accessories
49 Communication equipment
50 Electronic equipment and electric measuring instruments
51 Semiconductor devices and integrated circuits
52 Electronic parts
57 Precision machinery & equipment
JIP code IT-producing non-manufacturing sector
78 Telegraph and telephone 
90 Broadcasting
91 Information services and internet based services
JIP code Non-IT intensive manufacturing sector
8 Livestock products
9 Seafood products
10 Flour and grain mill products
11 Miscellaneous foods and related products




16 Lumber and wood products
17 Furniture and fixtures
18 Pulp, paper, and coated and glazed paper
19 Paper worked products
21 Leather and leather products
22 Rubber products
25 Basic organic chemicals
26 Organic chemicals
27 Chemical fibers
28 Miscellaneous chemical products
30 Petroleum products
31 Coal products
32 Glass and its products
33 Cement and its products
35 Miscellaneous ceramic, stone and clay products
36 Pig iron and crude steel
37 Miscellaneous iron and steel
39 Non-ferrous metal products 
40 Fabricated constructional and architectural metal products
41 Miscellaneous fabricated metal products
43 Special industry machinery
44 Miscellaneous machinery
54 Motor vehicles
55 Motor vehicles parts and accessories
58 Plastic products
JIP code Non-IT intensive non-manufacturing sector
62 Electricity
64 Waterworks







77 Other transportation and packing
81 Research (private)
87 Automobile maintenance services
89 Entertainment
93 Video picture, sound information, character information production and distribution
94 Eating and drinking places
95 Accommodations
96 Laundry, beauty and bath services
97 Other services for individuals
JIP code Other Industries
1 Rice, wheat production
2 Miscellaneous crop farming
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